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By  Friska Parulian
The  global  fi  nancial  crisis  hit  the  Southeast  Asian  economies 
through fi  nancial and real sectors by the combination of lower 
global demand and tighter credit demand effect.  The challenge 
for policymakers in this region is not just to prevent the escalation 
of the crisis and to mitigate the downturn, but also to ensure a 
good starting position once the rebound sets in.  Policymakers 
should avoid taking on an excessive level of debt or creating 
the conditions for an inﬂ  ationary bubble by the current reaction 
to the global slowdown.  A prudent counter-cyclical policy is 
necessary, and we should not ignore the medium and long-term 
sustainability.
1.  Global Financial Crisis: Implication for  Southeast Asia
  Economies around the world have been severely affected by the 
current  financial  turmoil,  as  a  vicious  circle  between  the  real  and 
financial sectors has been intensified.  The global economic prospects 
have been marked down further; it is now projected to decline to 1.3% in 
year 2009 even with the assumption of vigorous macroeconomic policy 
supports (IMF, 2009).  
  The impact has come to Southeast Asia through both the financial 
sector and the real sector, with the key channel for transmissions as follows: 
1) pressure on domestic investment through massive reversal of private capital 
fl  ow and shrinking of offi  cial aid, 2) liquidity constraint and greater volatility in the 
capital and foreign exchange markets, 3) declining trade volume through lower 
export demand, and 4) pressure on private consumption through reduction in 
remittances, decline in commodities prices, and worsening job market condition.
  For the group as a whole, growth is expected to decline for more than 
6% in 2007 to less than 1% in 2009; while measuring in terms of growth of GDP 
per capita it is expected to decline from 4.6% in 2007 to -0.8% in 2009. Figures 
1 and 2 present the development of countries’ growth and current account 
balance in the region.  Countries that relied most on manufacturing exports 
to industrial countries, including Singapore, the Philippines, and Cambodia, 
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were affected by the slowdown (ESCAP 
2009).1  Singapore is the hardest hit because 
of its role as a trade hub that supports 
trade-related services from transportation 
to trade finance; its export fell year-on-year 
by 40% in January 2009 and experienced 
the deepest cut of growth rate in the 
region. 
  On the other hand, domestic demand 
in  these  countries  is  not  sufficient  to 
compensate the falls in exports in 2008; 
since  in  open  economies,  domestic 
demand - especially private consumption 
and investment - is highly dependent on 
export demand and export commodities’ 
prices.    Private  investment  started  to 
contract at the end of 2008.  The global 
liquidity crunch made access to project 
financing  more  difficult,  especially  for 
those funded by foreign direct investment.   
These  two  components  may  worsen 
the current account balance especially 
for countries experiencing deficit.
  The crisis also contributes to a decline 
in foreign portfolio investment inflows and 
stock prices as well as adding volatility in 
the currency exchange rate.  In Vietnam 
the VN index fell about two thirds in 2008, 
while  in  Indonesia  the  JSX  index  in  the 
closing  transaction  of  year  2008  was 
recorded at less than half of 2007’s index 
value.  Some currencies of economies 
in this region also depreciated starting 
in the second half of 2008, which put 
more  pressure  on  countries  with  large 
external liabilities.
  The risk for the region remains tilted 
to the downside.  The key concern is that a 
deeper or longer recession in advanced 
economies outside Asia will dampen 
external demand leading to a negative 
impact for exports, investment, and growth.   
In addition, further deterioration in global 
financial  conditions  may  additionally 
tighten  financing  constraints,  hurting 
financial  and  corporate  sectors  in  the 
region.
2.  Monetary Policy Response
   Facing  with  a  rapidly  deteriorating 
condition from the end of 2008, most 
economies have aggresively loosened 
the monetary conditions. Figure 3 shows 
the monetary policy easing conducted 
in the region since January 2008.  Central 
banks  in  Indonesia,  Malaysia,  the 
Philippines,  Thailand,  and  Vietnam 
have cut policy rates and/or reduced 
the reserve requirements.  In addition, 
liquidity  injection  into  strained  money 
markets, drawn on reserves, and boost 
on available liquidity buffers have also 
been implemented in some economies.   
Singapore monetary authority  loosened 
its monetary policy and allowed a modest 
and gradual appreciation of Singapore 
dollar against a trade-weighted  basket of 
foreign  currencies  to  a  target  of  zero 
appreciation;  while  Vietnam  central 
bank  (SBV)  devalued  the  dong  and 
widened  the  dong-US$  trading  band 
from 0.75% to 3%.  Table 1 presents mon-
etary policy responses in Southeast Asia 
at the time of writing.
  For countries that operate an 
independent  monetary  policy,  a 
monetary  expansion  would  be  a 
sensible step to boost the domestic 
demand, where conditions allow it.  As 
a widely known rule of thumb, there 
is  probably  room  when  reserves  are 
above a target of 3 to 4 months of 
imports or equal to the amount of short 
term debt.  While taking price stability 
into consideration, the monetary stance 
should be relaxed if inflation is under 
control.  Due to heightened inflationary 
pressure in the first half of 2008, monetary 
policy options for many Southeast Asian 
economies were limited.  However, the 
reversal of commodities price trend in 
the second half of 2008 has dropped 
the  inflation  rate;  giving  room  for 
easing the monetary policy to support 
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Figure 3.  Monetary Policy Easing (Policy Rate in %)
Source: Website of respective central bank.






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source for Figures 1 and 2: ADB (2009a).ERIA Policy Brief, No. 2009-04, July 2009. 
growth.  These trends are expected 
to continue in 2009, with the average 
projected inflation rate in the region 
being 3.3%.
  Consistent  with  the  deterioration 
of  current  account  balance  and 
monetary easing, nominal exchange 
rates  depreciated  across  Southeast 
Asia.  Figure 4 shows that currencies in 
this region started depreciating in the 
second half of 2008.  To some degree, 
maintaining an adequate international 
reserve  has  provided  ammunition to 
counter exchange rate volatility and to 
sustain  foreign  currency  availability. 
However,  authorities  in  this  region 
may need to ensure the room for further 
monetary  easing  and  determine 
possible risk in the future. Post-recovery 
inflation  risk,  availability  of  credit 
channel/intermediation,  and  exposure 
to exchange rate volatility should be 
put into the policy’s analysis to ensure 
the  maximal  value  of  the  money.
  Table  2  presents  several  monetary 
indicators  to  observe  the  room  for 
monetary easing.  As pointed out in the 
table, countries like Cambodia, Laos, and 
Vietnam have smaller room compared 
to other economies, due to its low official 
foreign  reserves,  large  current  account 
deficit, and inflation risk in the near future.
  Monetary  easing  and  policy 
coordination in the region are important.   
However, some countries should put 
more attention before implementing 
further monetary expansion. Countries 
with high exposure to high inflation 
and facing particularly difficult external 
conditions - like large current account 
deficits, large rollover requirements, 
a  reliance  on  fragile  interbank 
flows, and dwindling reserves - may 
have to  tighten  monetary  policy 
to  preserve  external  stability,  despite 
adverse  consequences  for  domestic 
activity.
 
3.  Fiscal Policy Response: 
  Is There Enough Space 
  to Conduct Fiscal Stimulus?
  The  extent  of  the  downturn  and 
the  limits  to  monetary  policy’s 
effectiveness  has  increased  calls  for 
fiscal  stimulus.    Governments  are 
faced with a difficult balancing act; 
delivering  short-term  expansionary 
policies but also providing reassurance 
for medium term prospects.  The key 
policy issues then are whether there 
are room and capacity for effective 
counter-cyclical policies and whether 
responding  to  the  global  crisis  is  a 
policy priority for a specific country. 
  Two options of fiscal response could 
be considered to manage the current 
fiscal shock.  The first is delivering fiscal 
stimulus  consisting  expenditure-related 
measures  and/or  revenue-related 
measures.  Second, it may be possible 
to cope with the fiscal shock by making 
better  use  of  existing  resources,  e.g, 
by trimming low priority expenditure, 
suggesting an immediate need to review 
the  composition  of  public  expenditure 
and  to  reprioritize  less  productive  or 
wasteful  expenditures.    This  is  largely 
attributable  to  the  fact  that  during 
recession  constraints  on  the  financing 
of government budget and debt are 
usually tighter in emerging economies.
  A short-lived fiscal stimulus may be 
suitable for Southeast Asian economies, 
as  long  as  the  primary  role  is  to  lift 
internal  demand  and  to  protect  the 
vulnerable that are worse off even with 
the effort to lift aggregate demand.   
However,  whether  a  fiscal  stimulus 
will  offer  value-for-money  can  only 
be assessed on a case-by-case basis, 
depending on the individual country’s 
circumstances. 
  Fiscal stimulus has been implemented 
starting in year 2008 which varies both in 
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O = with policy response, X = no policy response
Source: ADB (2009b).
 Components / Country  Cambodia  Indonesia Lao PDR  Malaysia  Philippines  Singapore  Thailand  Vietnam
 Policy rate   X  O  X  O  O  X  O  O
 Reserve ratio  O  O  X  O  O  X  X  O
 Liquidity injection  X  O  X  X  X  O  X  X
 Exchange rate arrangement  O  O  X  X  O  O  X  O
Table 1.  Monetary Policy Responses in Southeast Asia

   Official Foreign Reserves  Current Account Balance  Inflation
  (Months of Imports)  (% of GDP)  (Annual Average %) 
  Brunei Darussalam  2.1  2.3  40.5  46.1  0.3  2.7  1.5
  Cambodia  5.0  3.5  -7.8  -14.0  5.9  19.7  7.0
  Indonesia  8.0  5.3  2.4  0.1  6.4  10.3  6.3
  Lao PDR  6.0  3.7  -19.7  -18.9  4.5  7.6  5.0
  Malaysia  9.0  8.3  15.6  17.9  2.0  5.4  1.5
  Philippines  7.0  5.7  4.9  2.5  2.8  9.3  4.5
  Singapore  8.0  5.1  23.5  14.8  2.1  6.5  0.5
  Thailand  8.0  6.7  5.7  -0.1  2.3  5.5  0.5
  Vietnam  5.0  4.1  -9.9  -9.3  8.3  23.0  4.0
  End 2007  End 2008  2007  2008  2007  2008  2009* 
Table 2. Several Monetary Indicators















































































































































































































































































Source : Website of respective central bank.
Source: ADB (2009a) and IMF, ”International Financial Statistics” (IMF Website). ERIA Policy Brief, No. 2009-04, July 2009. 
public  indebtness  reduces  the 
effectiveness  of  fiscal  policy,  and  the 
impact  becomes  negative  when  the 
debt level exceeds 60% of GDP.  These 
findings  point  to  the  need  for  a 
commitment to medium and long term 
fiscal sustainability to accompany any 
fiscal stimulus.  
  In short, the initial fiscal condition, 
the source of stimulus financing, and 
the contents of stimulus program are 
three  interrelated  factors  that  need 
to  be  considered  before  delivering 
any stimulus. Countries with relatively 
high public debt and large fiscal deficit 
should not consider delivering stimulus 
by creating new debt; only domestic 
financing or grant should be considered 
if stimulus needs to be delivered.  For 
these  countries,  the  second  policy 
options, making better use of existing 
resources,  may  give  more  benefit  to 
the  economy  rather  than  delivering 
a  stimulus.  Extra  care  is  needed  to 
ensure  that  it  provides  value-for-money.   
Fiscal  management  needs  to  be 
clearly  prioritized,  targeted,  and 
consistent with overall fiscal prudence 
and avoid excessive build-up in public 
debt and pressure on the balance of 
payments.
4. The Importance of 
  Policy Coordination 
  and Cooperation
  Different  from  the  previous  Asian 
financial  crisis,  the  current  crisis  has 
a  world-wide  scope.  Policy  makers 
in  emerging  economies  are  likely 
to  face  dilemmas  whose  solution 
will  be  highly dependent on how they 
behaved  during  the  boom  period, 
as  well  as  how the global shocks affect 
their  individual  economies.  Several 
countries have delivered fiscal stimulus, 
the type of instruments used and the size.   
Table  3  summarizes  fiscal  policy 
responses  conducted  or  plan  to  be 
conducted in Southeast Asian economies 
during 2008-2010.
  It  might  be  too  early  to  assess  the 
total  impact  and  effectiveness  of 
currently  announced  fiscal  stimulus, 
but there are some issues that should 
be  addressed  with  regard  to  its 
effectiveness.  First, it should be noted 
that stimulus may make fiscal positions 
of  these  economies  deteriorate  over 
time  with  consequences  on  interest 
rate, exchange rate, and inflation.  The 
anticipation  of  future  risk  is  necessary.   
Second, the observation of one economy’s 
capacity  and fiscal  space  to conduct 
a stimulus is also necessary.  Efforts to 
boost  demand  through  short-lived 
stimulus  should  not  ignore  concern 
about  medium  term  sustainability.   
The  initial  fiscal  condition  before 
implementing any stimulus is a key to 
see the fiscal space. Figures 5 and 6 
present  indicators  of  fiscal  space  in 
the Southeast Asian economies.
  From  the  previous  three  years 
data,  it  is  shown  that  only  Singapore 
and  Brunei  Darussalam  have  a  fiscal 
surplus,  though  Singapore  has  a  high 
total public debt to GDP ratio (102.6% 
in 2008).  In contrast, Vietnam, Laos, 
and Cambodia have both large fiscal 
deficit and high total public debt to 
GDP  ratio,  indicating  less  room  for 
conducting a fiscal stimulus.  Malaysia, 
Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines 
have  a  smaller  fiscal  deficit,  but 
their total public debt to GDP ratios are 
considerably high. 
  Conducting a large fiscal stimulus in 
economies characterized by large 
deficit and high public debt ratio may 
put  pressure  on  long  term  sustainability.   
The  World  Economic  Outlook  (IMF, 
2009)  shows  that  the  degree  of 















































































































































Table 3. Fiscal Policy Responses in Southeast Asia
Source for Figures 5 and 6: ADB (2009a).
O = with policy response, X = no policy response 
*excluded US$ 44.3 billion for infrastructure investment during 2010-2012 































































































































































































































































































Figure 6.  Total Public Debt (% of GDP)
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though  it  has  been  relatively  small 
(except  Singapore,  Vietnam,  and 
the  Philippines)  to  induce  domestic 
demand, and thus regional demand.   
However,  concern  on  strong  macro 
fundamentals  and  medium  term 
sustainability  in  the  region  should 
not  be  sacrificed  for  the  short-lived 
demand-boost.    Countries  with  fragile 
fiscal  and  monetary  stance  should 
consider  prudently  the  cost  of 
delivering  fiscal  stimulus  and  monetary 
easing,  while  countries  with  large 
space could contribute more. 
  Since  the  ideal  objective  of  stimulus 
is  to  induce  the  demand  during  the 
slowdown, the capacity and the space 
of countries that implementing are very 
crucial.    An  ambitious  stimulus  that 
ignores the medium term sustainability 
and future risk should be avoided.  It 
would worsen not only the economy 
performance  but  also  regional  stability 
since the high degree of trade openness 
and  financial  sector  linkage  might 
transfer any volatility faster than before.
  Though  the  effectiveness  of  current 
policy  easing  is  still  in  long  lasting 
debate,2 it is crucial to strengthen policy 
cooperation  to  provide  a  well-timed, 
targeted, and sizeable policy.  A one-for-all 
solution policy should be avoided, and 
the characteristics of each economy 
should be given more consideration.   
A practice of prudent macroeconomic 
policy  and  regional  cooperation  are 
needed  to  anticipate  post-recovery 
inflation  risk  and  maintain  long  term 
sustainability in the region.
____________________________
1  For several episodes of the crisis impact over specific 
countries see Chandarot, et al. (2009), Djaja (2009), and 
ESCAP (2009).
2  See  Eskesen  (2009),  Hemming,  et  al.  (2002),  and 
Muhleisen (2000).
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